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Abstract: The discussion between these two great streams of  the Western political 
thought, normative and critical philosophies, can’t forget its political-philosophical Greek 
root in the Aristotelian thought. His philosophy defends a path that doesn’t adhere to 
extremes, but focuses on allying logically the ontic purpose and the unforeseeability of  the 
results, which are only likely. 
In this paper, we address the dialectical movement between the ethical awareness of  the 
individual and the political and legal organization of  the excellent polis, in the thought of  
Aristotle. The man can only fulfill his end as a human being by internalising the 
heteronomous good expressed in the ethically constituted nomos and by the conscious 
exteriorization of  the good in his own praxis. In short, the man may only become 
complete while an ethical being as he lives in an ethical community, i.e., a politically and 
legally organized community. 
 






The Aristotelian ethical and political thought, even though finalistic and thus liable 
to be characterized as normative for the contemporary philosophy, has the 
peculiarity of  recognizing its boundaries and limits, as it will be discussed below. 
According to this author, life in the righteous polis is the only possible way tomen 
to carry out their essences and therefore to be what they should be. 
However, the life path that the inductive observation of  human behavior 
points out is only a probable path. It is not a necessary and progressive process 
that historically reveals itself  to reason and because of  reason. It is not a necessary 
path, because there is no absolute guarantee thatthe consciousness of  virtue is 
formed in the free ethical subject, because man is always tensioned between desire 
and reason. Even though not a necessary path, this path is the most probable way 
                                                 
1In this article we mean by dialectical the way of  explaining the becoming, the process of  being what it is in 
essence of  the human being, but without finding a causal or necessary link between the stages because this is 
the field of  practical reason. We state that in the Aristotelian thought the fulfillment of  the purpose of  the 
human beings is a dialectical process of  interaction between the law – the objective and social reason – and the 
virtue – the individual conscience. In this movement, there are continually exteriorization of  social standards 
that contain abstract concepts of  order and freedom and a progressive conscious and individual interiorization 
of  these standards that allows each one of  us to criticize them and improve them.  
2 Professor of  Philosophy of  Law in the Faculty of  Law of  the Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. 
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to create virtue, and thus, the most probable mean for men to become precisely 
what men already are in essence and the most probable mean to live a good life 
both individually and collectively. 
We can conclude that Aristotle is not isolated inside a normative castle. He 
does not loses sight of  the reality that unfolds beyond it, even though he points 
out the guidelines that can lead to self-realization of  men in their existences. His 
thought keeps a critical perspective regarding ethical-political human societies, to 
the extent that it argues that the guidelines of  those societies are not in themselves 
necessary, as they can’t guarantee the occurrence of  the result so desired, the 
eudaimonia. 
We, therefore, believe that a discussion that counteract these two great 
streams of  Western political thought, the normative and critical philosophies, can’t 
forget its political-philosophical Greek root in the Aristotelian thought. His 
philosophy defends a path that doesn’t adhere to extremes, but focuses on allying 
logically the ontic purpose and the unforeseeability of  the results, which are only 
likely. 
In this paper, we address the dialectical movement between the ethical 
awareness of  the individual and the political and legal organization of  the excellent 
polis, in the thought of  Aristotle. The man can only fulfill his end as a human being 
by internalising the heteronomous good expressed in the ethically constituted nomos 
and by the conscious exteriorization of  the good in his own praxis. In short, men 
may only become complete while ethical beings as they live in ethical communities, 
i.e., in politically and legally organized communities. In Aristotle's thought, there's 
no doubt that reason is capable to grasp and to express this movement. On the 
other hand, reason knows it has boundaries when effectively intends to determine 
the choice to the ethical purposes it identifies. 
 
2. ETHICS, POLITICS AND LAW 
 
To Aristotle, human existence has as its end the actualization of  the specific work 
that defines us as human beings. The peculiar function of  man is rationality. To live 
is to be in motion and our work is the activity according to reason. We must add 
thatas the flute player, we can simply perform our work or we can exercise it well. 
The excellence of  the rational activity is the purpose and the ratio essendi of  every 
human being(Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1, 1094 a 1-16; I, 2, 1094 a 18-22; I, 2, 1094b, 7-
10). 
Rationality operates by capturing the immanent intelligible form in the 
sensible, contained in the sensation or fantasy, which allows us to identify, explain 
and transform the entities. However, the cognitive performance is only possible 
when reason curbs appetite. Thus, the apprehension of  the intelligible for us also 
means the possibility to identify, from the apprehension of  the surroundings, a 
course of  action that presents consequences more enjoyable or more appropriate 
to the activity of  reason. However, the excellence of  reason, according to Aristotle, 
is not achievable by the individual man. 
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Our reason is logos enhuloi. Its activity can’t be and is not separable from the 
body. It is conditioned by the material world on which it operates and the material 
world is its limit. The sensitive organs can’t simultaneously receive all possible 
internal and external sensations. The existent is composed of  form and matter, and 
matter is subject to movement, is subject to the continuous updating of  its poten-
tiality. Because of  that, the material world is in constant state of  corruption. 
Therefore, reason is not able to predict or anticipate all contingencies which 
govern its activity while attached in the matter, i.e., while in constant transfor-
mation. Each singularity lived provides more data to the next experience, but not 
the wholeness of  the information which would enable reason to select the perfect 
or final option. 
Furthermore, reason is also subject to movement, even though not to the 
same extent and degree that the body is. Our reason is not the same throughout 
our existence. It matures itself  and degenerates itself. It is in itself  apatheia, but the 
logos enhuloi is affected by the matter, i.e., the reason in itself  doesn't corrupt or 
change, but the compound that acts rationally corrupts itself  and transforms itself  
(On the Soul, I, 4, 408 b 18-30). Man becomes by the passing time more fit to 
reasoning because he exercises its reasoning, because everyday experience increases 
his database, i.e., increases the amount of  sensations and sensitive images stored 
and from which the intellect draws the intelligible. In addition to that, the reason in 
this compound seeks the intelligible immanent to the sensible corruption not only 
of  the compound itself, but in the reality itself, i.e., the reason seeks the permanent 
in change. Thus, even if  reason itself  does not change, reason in the matter is 
perfected by its own activity. As Aristotle says: «[…] intellectual excellence in the 
main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires 
experience and time)» (Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1, 1103 a 15). 
There is more to consider. The body is the instrument by which reason 
acts. As composed of  matter, the body matures and degenerates. In our childhood 
we are not capable of  the same degree of  judgment that we have in our adult lives. 
Likewise, our memory and understanding are not the same in our old age. In old 
age, deterioration of  the body begins to interfere with our ability to collect the 
sensitive shape, to reserve it and access it, which undermines the role of  reason in 
the capture of  the intelligible. 
In our childhood the amount of  experiences lived is minimal and thus the 
possibility of  reason to identify and to anticipate a broad scenario of  consequences 
is also reduced. Therefore, our choices do not represent, albeit rationally pointed 
out, the excellence of  the rational activity. In general, we say that children hardly 
act rationally and, at least in most cases, they act without the full awareness of  the 
consequences of  their actions. Owners of  a reason so feeble, they seem to 
succumb to the sensible wishes and move like animals, driven by external forces. 
The desire for pleasure is limitless and opposes itself  to any form of  
restriction. Rationality is limit because it's shape, i.e., determination, individuali-
zation of  matter, of  the shapeless, of  the indeterminate(Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13, 
1102 b 23-31). In each individual, a battle between the limited and the boundless, 
between reason and irrational is waged having as its purpose the supreme end, i.e., 
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the self-realization of  man. This self-realization is the achievement of  what we 
should be (and are in potentiality) since the beginning: outstanding rational activity. 
However, if  the reason operates over matter and, as such, is 'weakened' by the 
movement of  matter, it fails to place the desire in the right measure. In this case 
reason requires aid. This aid is provided by the ethical habit formed in the subject 
by the paideia, that is, the rectification of  the appetite towards the end rationally 
fixed(Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 1142b 15-35; Magna Moralia, I, 6, 1185b 38 – 1186 2). 
The relationship between rational beings exponentially increases the unique 
experiences sensitively gathered and rationally interpreted. The sharing between 
subjects of  countless singularities is what allows reason to leap from its former 
position as a mere servant of  bestiality to the place of  threshold imposed on the 
non-limit. Although rationality major duty is the capture of  the intelligible form 
immersed in the matter, in the individual subject it is tied to the ephemerality and 
to the process of  corruption-and-generation of  the body and of  the material 
world. 
Only in front of  another subject who makes the same tasks and 
communicates his work is reason capable of  raising itself  to the rank of  master of  
the body. The work communicated is the result of  the rational activity of  the other 
subject. It works as a portal which connects us to a myriad of  experiences, 
inductions and generalizations and which allows us to start our own walking now 
equipped with all that information. Thus, we will recognize objects not seen 
because they were rationally learned from the experiences of  others. We shall be 
able to anticipate the consequences not experienced by us, but that we memorized 
from the communication with others. 
There is more. The contact with other rational beings can arouse in us the 
reason that was overshadowed by instinct and necessity. Reason then seeks to act in 
the achievement of  its own goals and realizes that only by controlling the desire it 
will be able to accomplish its purposes. Thus, that reason which first was an 
instrument of  the instinct becomes a means to itself, i.e., starts to pursue its own 
activities and accomplishments. Reason is now competing with the appetite for the 
fulfillment of  its own goals. 
However, appetite is opposed to the rational imposition and obeys it only 
when conditioned to want what reason determines as correct. The rectification of  
appetite is the work of  the community which guides the individual through 
education to act according its rules. Thus, eudaimonia will only be achieved by men 
raised by a good community, i.e., a community which has rules in agreement with 
what is right in accordance to reason (Simpson, 1998, p. 2-3).The acquisition of  
the virtuous habit requires others, who have the power to convince us, to transmit 
to us what is good and to constrain us to practice it. To Aristotle, the political 
community is the one which holds this power and the law is its instrument of  
persuasion and coercion in the achievement of  this goal (NicomacheanEthics, X, 9, 
1179a 33 – 1181b 15). 
The law is the main instrument of  paideia insofar as it orders the practice of  
all virtues and prohibits all vices. So conceived, it is universal justice, i.e., it is the 
result of  the ongoing process of  reflection and of  collective decision of  the reason 
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about the good. It is what promotes the conscious evaluation of  the ethos and what 
universally imposes it, through the apparatus of  state power. It pursues social order 
and harmony, and as such, promotes the formation of  the ethical habit in the 
individuals, which is the essential way to the acquisition of  the ethical virtue. This 
result does not depend on any arbitrary law, but on the righteous law, that law 
which was drafted by the legitimate rulers of  the polis in accordance to reason and 
considering the promotion of  the ethical virtue (Simpson, 1998, p. 4-5). A 
righteous law is the one that distributes the goods of  the city among its members 
in the proportion of  their merits, promoting equality between them (Nicomachean 
Ethics, V, 1, 1129 b 26 – 35). 
We must add that it is not enough for the law to be fair, but it is necessary 
the proper application of  the law to the relations and disputes of  men. When 
someone breaks the equality established by the distribution of  goods, acquiring in 
the everyday negotiations and exchanges more than he should acquire, intentionally 
or not, the political apparatus of  the community must intervene in this relationship 
and return the parties to equilibrium, to the status quo ante. The good polis is the one 
that applies law fairly. It is up to the rulers, thus, the development of  righteous laws 
and the fair application of  the law to the solution of  the private conflicts, so that 
the polis is indeed able to provide the conditions for self-realization to its members 
(Kraut, 2002, p. 378-379). 
3. DISCRETIONARY POWER AND LAW 
However, Aristotle knows that it is possible that the laws do not meet these 
requirements. First, because the one who creates them can be wrong as to what is 
the benefit of  citizens, even if  he is able to create suitable rules for the promotion 
of  the evil that he had conceived as good. Second, because those who create the 
laws, right or wrong about the welfare of  men, may be unable to implement in the 
laws this idea of  good. Thus, evaluation of  justice in a city should be assessed in 
relation both to the design of  good that it has, and in its ability to perpetuate such 
ideals in the laws. 
Even the righteous are not exempt from mistakes (Politcs, III, 16, 1287a 30-
31).Human reason is not omniscient and can’t anticipate all the circumstances in 
which one act is circumscribed. Besides that, excellence is not achieved in one 
action, but throughout the whole existence, and during this journey, even the most 
virtuous of  men may give in to the pressure of  his own desires.On the other hand, 
even if  the law is based on the work of  sentient beings, law itself  does not have 
passions (Politcs, III, 15, 1286a 19). When the law is not the result of  selfish desire 
as in tyrannies, it is not the result of  the will of  a single man, but represents the 
conscious reflection of  an entire community about what we should or should not 
do.In regimes in which law prevails over the egoistic will of  the rulers, it is usually 
the representation of  the repeated and rationalized praxis of  a community.Thus, we 
believe that for the Stagirite the guarantee of  a good polis, or of  righteous laws and 
fair application of  these laws, can be attained by all legal political regimes, i.e., for 
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all political systems in which the egoistic will of  rulers is submitted to the law.3 All 
legal systems are suitable to the formation of  the virtue of  its citizens, although 
there is some hierarchy amongst them in the achievement of  such purpose.  
However, the law is designed and implemented by men and therefore is 
subject to theirs vicissitudes. Bad men make bad laws. The law also does not 
foresee any possible circumstance. The law is general and will always require 
supplementation in order to be applied to current facts, especially when we 
consider that the human needs are in constant change (Politcs, III, 15, 1286a 10 -
13).The finding of  the supremacy of  the law over the selfish desire of  the ruler 
does not elide the issue. Although the law might be the more reliable parameter of  
conduct that men provide to themselves –to the extent that stems from the 
examination and of  judgment of  the various choices of  the various men 
throughout history and do not stems of  a selfish desire of  a single man– it does 
not represent the definitive option for action (Politcs, III, 16, 1287a 18 – 1287b 
20).The law is the product of  human deliberation and, as such, can’t anticipate all 
the circumstances which we shall face throughout our lives. Of  course its selection 
of  situations covers much more cases than those that a man could live or even 
imagine. But the law does not cover all possible human concrete experiences and 
not even those of  one man. 
The modus operandi of  reason is the unification of  the infinitely diverse and 
complex things into similar traits, general and simple. When the legislator examines 
the myriad of  human experiences, his rational inquire seeks amongst them 
similarities that can bring them together and make them an increasingly smaller 
subject to be understood. Each situation that seems unique to sensitivity becomes, 
gradually and faced with the reason, common to other facts. The natural human 
reactions to that same event are compared with each other and in relation to their 
consequences. After that, one of  these actions is chosen as the one that should be 
taken every time that this event occurs. In this process what was concretely 
exclusive of  this or that situation examined is dropped when setting the fact that 
unifies them. In concrete, however, the situations we face regain its former 
uniqueness. The real will always be singular. 
One could say that there would be no problem on the illustration described 
above if  the goal of  the law was, simply, to list any course of  action to men. But if  
the purpose of  the law, as intended by the Stagirite, is to prescribe the best path of  
conduct possible to citizens, then we can’t overlook its generality in relation to the 
facts. 
If  the law is, by its own nature, a generalization of  concrete situations, its 
immutability or its strict application to any particular case will not be the best 
solution, it will not achieve justice, its raison d'être. It is necessary that those who 
                                                 
3In this sense, we disagree with the position of  Kraut which holds that only the monarchy and aristocracy can 
lead to human excellence and the republic (politia) can, at most, form good citizens (and others regimes not 
even good citizens). For the arguments of  Kraut, check: 2002, p. 383-470. The choice of  the regime does have 
some repercussions, for the Stagirite, in the reaching of  the common good and of  the individual good, but if  
the regime is legal, that is, if  the will of  the rulers submits itself  to the rule of  the law, the polis can provide the 
formation of  the virtue of  its members. In this sense, check: MAGALHÃES GOMES, 2010, p. 201-213. 
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exercise the functions of  government in the polis can judge the law and change it, 
because of  new unforeseen circumstances, or adapt it, because of  the singularities 
of  the case to which the law is being applied. Because of  its generality, the fair 
application of  the law depends on the discretion of  the rulers, both the legislators 
and the judges (Politcs, III, 15, 1286a 20-25). 
To what extent the discretionary power of  the rulers is legitimate? How can 
we ensure that the rulers do not go beyond this measure, given that they own the 
force of  the State (Politics, III, 15, 1286b 32-33)? The law is the product of  human 
deliberation. And if  those who govern us and create the laws are not good men, 
what will guarantee that the rules established by them are fair? 
As regards the discretionary power, we understand that there are limits 
which the ruler must obey, otherwise his decision is illegitimate. Formally, the 
highest limit to the discretionary power of  the ruler, whether he is the legislator or 
the judge, is the politeia. The decisions of  the ruler can’t overtake or denature the 
fundamental principles that characterize the regime of  government established by 
the politeia. Otherwise, there is no established order and we are at the mercy of  the 
selfish will of  the ruler. Sets the Stagirite: 
 
«A constitution is the arrangement of  magistracies in a state, especially of  
the highest of  all. The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, 
and the constitution is in fact the government. [...] (Política, III, 6, 1278b 
9-11) – grifosnossos». 
 
If  the decision of  the ruler is in accordance with the underlying principles 
of  that regime of  government, it was not arbitrary; otherwise is unlawful and must 
be reversed (Politics, V, 3, 1303rd 21-24; V, 7, 1307b 2-6). The politeia is the true 
nature of  a political community and thus the essence of  its unit. Thus, for 
Aristotle, the duty of  every citizen is to preserve their politeia. 
Materially, the decision must be judged in the light of  the common interest. 
The correct regimes are those in which rulers act in the best interest of  all (Politics, 
III, 13, 1283b 36-42). The ruler can’t put the interest of  certain parts of  the city 
above all others, but should guide their decisions by the achievement of  the good 
of  the city as a whole; they must be impartial (Kraut, 2002, p. 389). In each case, 
the discretionary power of  the ruler should be confronted to the common good: if  
there is the intention to strongly favor the interests of  one part of  the city at the 
expense of  the good of  others, the decision is unlawful and must be reversed; 
otherwise it can be maintained. Finally, it is necessary to comment that the Stagirite 
warns that the alteration of  laws can’t become a habit; otherwise laws will lose their 
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4. DIALECTICS BETWEEN LAW AND VIRTUE 
 
Regarding the guarantee of  the justice of  the laws, the position of  the Stagirite is 
circular. In order to the laws to be good, men should be good. In order to men to 
be good, laws must be good. 
The laws of  a city, as long as circumscribed in a legal regime, are a mini-
mum of  justice, although its content is not perfectly virtuous. First, because they 
establish order and security, a way of  proceeding in everyday actions which applies 
to everyone and that is the same under similar circumstances. The prevalence of  
the law is the realization of  some portion of  justice, because it guarantees the 
existence of  some impartiality of  the lawmakers, or of  some consideration for the 
common good despite their own interests. 
Moreover, even the law created by non-virtuous men (but law-abiding men) 
captures, even if  partially, the experiences of  his community throughout history. 
There was, in the preparation of  that law, some reflection about the customs of  his 
community, and, therefore, some evaluation from those decisions taken earlier on. 
So, the choice of  one of  them as a parameter is made it because that one 
experience was considered the best to run. Although this reflection and choice may 
have been misguided –because they didn’t identified the true purpose of  our 
actions, or because they didn't identified the best means to achieve it– there was, in 
this process, examination, judgment and choice about what to do in certain 
circumstances, which makes this path of  conduct better than that instincts impose 
on us. 
More than this, the creation of  the law is not a lonely reflection out of  a 
small number of  personal experiences about a choice. The whole process of  
creating the law is a collective one. The experiences that serve as its parameter and 
that are analyzed and compared by its creators are the customs, the ideals and 
opinions of  a large group of  men, contemporaries and ancestors of  the legislators. 
The decision, implementation, execution and subordination to the law are also acts 
of  several men, even if  carried out, at a given moment, by just one man. 
The law is –when not an exclusive product of  a selfish desire– usually, a 
conscious and collective model of  conduct to the individual man. It is the product 
of  the reflection and of  the choice of  a whole group of  men over the best way to 
conduct them in life; and as such, their goals surpass those who we might establish 
individually for ourselves. This does not make it perfect, but our best option of  
action at a given time. This does not make it unchangeable, but a constancy, which 
guarantees some order and security in this so fickle world. 
The relationship between social rules established in a certain community, 
that informs human behavior, and the concrete actions of  the individuals of  that 
society, which reinforce or undermine the prevailing ethos and nomos, involves 
different moments. The reiterated praxis of  the group forms the body of  rules, i.e., 
shapes the rational and collective conditions of  the action of  those individuals. 
This diffuse social order, in turn, is evaluated continuously by those who create and 
enforce the obligatory social rules, the nomoi. The laws of  a community result from 
comparative reflection about the various maxims of  action, about the customs, 
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about the ideals, about the opinions of  the group and about the laws that already 
exist. From this analysis there is the choice and the setting of  a mandatory 
parameter of  conduct for all the members of  that community, which is the 
objective rationality of  this group. The custom is not irrational, but its effect on 
individual conduct is pervasive and unconscious. Rather, the creation and 
application of  each law result from conscious reflection on the circumstances of  
the action and of  the careful choice of  the action parameter to be laid down for all 
those who live in that community. There is, therefore, an overlapping spiral of  the 
causal circularity of  the ethos. To the dialectical movement custom-habit, mediated 
through individual action, overlaps with another circle. In this second circle, there 
is conscious evaluation of  the first and its outcome is the nomos, which feeds back 
the ethical circle. The nomos imposes itself  on the action and shapes habits that 
reinforce/modify the ethos. Over this second circle a third one arises: the judge 
evaluates the fact in the light of  the nomos and of  the ethos and, then, he decides. 
His sentence informs individual action and reinforces/modifies the ethos and the 
nomos. 
But for men to behave in accordance with existing regulations it is 
necessary that they know it and therefore the ethos and the nomos must be 
transmitted to individuals through education. The group reflects on the ethos and 
the nomos, even if  not yet methodically, and, then, it shapes upon those principles 
of  action a knowledge that enables its transmission and collective representation. 
At the same time, to the extent that the individuals steadily acquire the habit of  
performing certain actions, the ethos and the nomos reassert themselves as a tradition 
of  that people and, then, they effectively exist in the conduct of  each of  those 
individuals. 
The aforementioned argument does not mean, however, that the subject 
becomes virtuous. Individuals can obey the rules only because they fear the 
consequences of  the noncompliance. Nevertheless, the continuity of  action in 
accordance with the rules creates a habit to carry them out and enables the 
rectifying of  the appetite of  men. But man isn’t an external moldable mass that can 
be casted without any reflection or self-direction. The rules imposed socially act on 
a rational being, capable of  understanding them and judge them. The individual 
that at first wanted only what was imposed by desire, now wants what the rule 
imposes. In this continuous movement of  exteriorization of  duty, the man, as a 
rational being, becomes aware of  the value of  the rule itself  and consequently of  
the value of  his actions. The consciousness of  the good contained in the rule and 
practiced by him may cause that the abiding of  the rule happens for its own sake, 
for its virtue. The man practices virtuous actions by themselves, because they are 
the good towards he moves as a way to achieve his perfection. 
The social life of  the law allows, in principle, the formation of  civic virtue, 
that is, respect for and defense of  the existing order. Citizens come to understand 
that the existence of  the group depends on the permanence of  the order that 
sustains it. Not all the citizens of  this political community are excellent men; 
maybe none of  them are. But, at least, they are good citizens, because they 
understand the importance of  their laws and they guarantee, by respecting them, 
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the continuity of  their polis. In a second moment, the rational maturing of  that 
political community allows a deeper reflection and evaluation about the law. Yes, 
the existence of  a set of  rules is vital for the continuity of  the group, but that does 
not mean that every rule should be kept, whatever the cost. Order and safety are 
not the only ends of  the political community. The ultimate end of  the polis is the 
good life of  its citizens. The one that fully lives is the one that excellently realizes 
(makes real in concrete) his work, and, for rational beings, the one that excellently 
realizes reason. The polis should create the conditions for the development of  
virtue and, to do so, its rules can’t prescribe any arbitrary content, but should 
impose the practice of  all the virtues and banish the vices. 
The final statement is: the rule of  law possibly enables the building of  
good citizens, and good citizens can possibly create good laws, and good laws 
possibly enable the building of  good men, and good men can possibly create good 




The State is a community of  men organized towards a common end. Its existence 
and its success (the accomplishment of  its ultimate end) depend on the building of  
those men. It means that the State is only possible if  its constituent parts (indivi-
duals, families, organizations, and so on) want and act towards the realization of  
the common goal. Those parts should cooperate with each other and each one 
should realize its specific function. 
We can say, nevertheless, that the individuals are the core of  this 
organization, because only they can act towards the ultimate end. They create the 
rules, they give life to the institutions, they are the ones that should be built in 
order to want and act towards their own ends which are, by consequence, the end 
of  the polis. Therefore, the State can’t rely exclusively on familial and social training 
of  its citizens. The State must also be a promoter of  the education of  its members, 
so that their will and acts will be according to its purposes. And the law is the 
appropriate instrument of  the State in the building of  their citizens.5 
The process of  formation and improvement of  laws and men is a virtuous 
circle, in which the mechanical compliance of  the law can become the awareness 
of  the importance of  the existence of  the law for the community and the 
consciousness of  the importance of  the good content of  the law for the self-
realization of  man. 
The continuous process of  formation of  human excellence through the 
awareness of  the virtue of  the law will not necessarily make all men good, but it 
can make all citizens good, and probably most of  men good. Of  course this is a 
slow and difficult process, but it is the only possible way. 
                                                 
4Likewise, the absence of  the rule of  the law can promote a vicious circle (Politcs, V 8, 1307b 31-39). 
5In Books VII-VIII of  the Politics, Aristotle describes the ideal education of  the citizens. About the educational 
and legislative model presented by the Stagirite in Politics, check:Irwin, 2002, p. 416-423; Düring, 2005, p. 748-
757; Mondolfo, 2003, p. 88-89; Kraut, 2002, p. 197-214; Simpson, 1998, p. 233-283; Hourdakis, 2001. On 
education by law in the Aristotelian thought, check: Romilly, 2004, p. 159-174. 
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Reason is capable of  apprehending and expliciting the diversity of  the 
ethical conduct, as the normative posture of  philosophical thinking defends, but it 
can’t guarantee that, even in the presence of  the ideal conditions, man will 
necessarily choose to act in accordance to the ethical end by the reason revealed. 
The probability and not the certainty of  the action is what allows us to recognize 
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